s which would prohibit its reproduction.
90. Editorial Note
On June 5, 1961, Secretary of State Rusk, who had returned to Paris the
previous evening, briefed the North Atlantic Council and President de Gaulle
on the meetings in Vienna. At the restricted meeting of the Council at 10:15
a.m. Rusk circulated copies of the two Soviet aides-memoire, reviewed in
some detail the progress of the talks, stated that they were not intended
to be negotiations but rather a preliminary exchange of observations on U.S.-U.S.S.R.
relations, and concluded that they had produced no surprises. (Polto Circular
telegram 7, June 5; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6-561)
At 3 p.m. the Secretary of State briefed de Gaulle at the Elysee Palace.
After brief reviews of the discussion of Laos and disarmament, Rusk went
into some detail on the conversations on Berlin, stating that Khrushchev
had been "quite firm on all questions dealing with Berlin," and adding that
it seemed to be the main one for the Chairman. The Secretary added that
Khrushchev had become quite emotional at some points in the discussion of
Germany and seemed "to greatly fear a unified and rebuilt Germany which
would be an ally of the West." When asked why he thought the Chairman wanted
to see President Kennedy, Rusk speculated that there was some curiosity on
both sides, and that the President wanted to show that the United States
was prepared to defend its interest. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110,
CF 1901)
On June 5 Assistant Secretary of State Kohler went to Bonn to brief Chancellor
Adenauer. After an initial report on the President's talks in Paris with
de Gaulle, Kohler immediately noted that the discussions at Vienna "had
scarcely contributed towards détente," and added that it had been
a "hard" meeting. The Assistant Secretary then summarized the talks on Laos
and disarmament before concentrating on Berlin. He concluded by stating:
"If any conclusion could be drawn . . . it was the possibility of a developing
crisis on Berlin, probably after the Soviet Party Congress in October.
This was, however, pure speculation. The tone of the meeting was civil and
reasonably courteous, but the substance of what was said was hard on both
sides." (Ibid., Central Files, 611.51/6-561)
While Rusk and Kohler were in Paris and Bonn, the President had flown
to London to brief the British. The President explained the Soviet view
on Berlin and also gave Prime Minister Macmillan an extensive account
of his talks with de Gaulle on the future of Europe. (Notes on a Private Discussion,
June 5; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1901) At a second meeting
the President and the Prime Minister discussed how to proceed on Berlin.
For a record of this conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963,
volume XIV, pages 98-102.
91. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 6, 1961, 4:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, France. The source text bears no classification or drafting information. Printed in part in Declassified Documents, 1986, 2256.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP
PRESENT
The Vice President, Senators Mansfield, Humphrey, Russell, Fulbright,
Dirksen, Saltonstall, Hickenlooper, Wiley
The Speaker, Congressmen McCormack, Albert, Vinson, Morgan, Arends, Chiperfield,
Hoeven, Byrnes (Wisconsin)
{Here follows discussion of Kennedy's meeting with de Gaulle.}
II. Khrushchev
The President reported that the most important subject discussed on the
first day had been Laos; that he and Khrushchev had agreed that Laos
should be neutral in the same fashion as Cambodia and Burma, but that
Khrushchev had not appeared really much interested in Laos. The most ominous
discussion of the first day had been Khrushchev's doctrine of the three wars.
In the President's judgment, Khrushchev now feels that there is a balance
in the nuclear field which prevents us from using nuclear weapons for local
purposes. He feels further that in local engagements the shorter lines of
communication and the large manpower of the Sino-Soviet bloc will give it
a decisive advantage--whatever number of men we put in, they can put in several
times as many. Moreover, Khrushchev insists upon the validity of his third
kind of war, namely, the war of liberation, or sacred war. The President
reported that in Khrushchev's view Iran and South Korea were going to
collapse, and his own riposte with respect to Poland. The President believed
that this very militant Soviet effort will continue.
Returning to Laos, the President said that there had been some language
agreed on in the communiqué,/2/ and that
perhaps something would come from it. He also expressed his view that Khrushchev
was partly right in saying that not all weaknesses in governments and danger
of Communist take-over could be attributed to the Communists themselves.
The President reported that Khrushchev seemed uninterested in Cuba. Khrushchev
said that Castro was not a Communist but we were making him one. The President
reported Khrushchev's view that the present situation was like the period
during the decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. The President
had answered that in that period there had been a lot of wars, and we should
try to prevent such a situation now, to which Khrushchev replied that if we
want war we can have it. To a question from Senator Fulbright, the President
replied that Khrushchev seemed rather bitter on Nasser and that he (the
President) had written three letters to Nasser,/3
which seemed to produce some improvement in Nasser's feeling toward the United
States.
/2/For text of the joint communiqué, see American Foreign Policy:
Current Documents, 1961, p. 574.
/3/Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic. Copies
of the letters are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot
66 D 204, UAR.
Senator Humphrey commented that perhaps we ought not to jump to the conclusion
that all people of this sort are going Communist, and referred to the example
of Qasim/4/ in Iraq. The President then read
excerpts from the minutes of the conversation after lunch on Saturday, beginning
on page 1 and continuing through page 3. (The President specifically omitted
reference to his own remarks about the Cuban situation.)
/4/Abdul Karim Kassim, Premier of Iraq.
Senator Dirksen asked whether there was discussion of CENTO, and the President
said there was not, and repeated his view of the Soviet sense of a change
in the power balance. The President then read a passage relating to the
Soviet view of the sacred war and how the United States used to be in favor
of such revolution but was not any longer.
Asked about the Congo, the President reported Khrushchev's statement
that his experience in the Congo was what confirmed in him the necessity for
the Troika. To a question from Senator Fulbright about arms limitation in
Africa, the President replied that the matter had not been discussed. The
President read from the memorandum of conversation to explain Mr. Khrushchev's
remarks about Taiwan.
To a question from Senator Dirksen, the President commented that there
had been only a brief reference to U.S. bases.
On Sunday the discussion began with nuclear testing and Mr. Khrushchev had
insisted on the Troika, stating that there was no such thing as a neutral
person. Control in such circumstances was a form of espionage. There could
be no serious control or inspection until after the decision for complete
and general disarmament had been accepted. Mr. Khrushchev had urged that
the President should agree to a merger of the test talks with disarmament,
and the President's conclusion was that either from Chinese pressure or
for other reasons the Soviets have lost interest in a test ban agreement.
The President replied that in his view it would be wrong to merge the test
ban with general disarmament since for fifteen years discussion of the latter
subject had gotten nowhere. Khrushchev said that when we start to test, he
will start to test. The main question now was how to disengage from these
negotiations. Macmillan and the President had talked about this matter, which
was a hot issue in England. Gaitskell/5/ had
also expressed his hope that we could wait until the autumn, until after his
own contest for control in his own party, which he expected to win. This was
a problem in Canada, too, and in general a major question of propaganda
values. The question was how to break it off so that the Soviets would seem
to be responsible.
/5/Hugh T.M. Gaitskell, Leader of the British Labour Party.
Discussion then turned to Germany, which was what, in the President's
judgment, Khrushchev had come to talk about. He gave us an aide-memoire on
Germany/6/ and it was on this subject, for the
first time, that his voice began to rise. The President read at length from
the memorandum of conversation to show Khrushchev's position on Germany and
his own response. Senator Fulbright asked whether there was a time limit
on these discussions, and the President replied, "He said December." Then
he read further from a memorandum of conversation and particularly emphasized
this sentence of Khrushchev's: "The USSR would never under any conditions
accept U.S. rights in Berlin after a peace treaty had been signed."
Senator Dirksen asked three questions: (1) What is Khrushchev's physical condition?
The President said it was good. (2) Was there any other arrogance about him?
The President said no. (3) Should we expect a recognition of East Germany
before December? The President said that in his view there might well be a
signing of a peace treaty at some such time, and that the Soviets would say
that all rights reverted to the East Germans, although they might in fact
not do anything to interfere with our access (which the President noted was
Prime Minister Macmillan's belief). And as far as military access was concerned,
our own troops could be supplied with four air sorties a day. To the question
whether Khrushchev had described the period of time for which the Free City
would have the rights he offered, the President said that the answer was not
clear.
/6/For text of the aide-memoire on Germany, see Department of State Bulletin,
August 7, 1961, pp. 231-233.
The President then quoted again from the aide-memoire to explain the Soviet
proposal on a Free City, and also the Soviet view that a peace treaty would
formally end occupation rights.
Senator Humphrey asked whether East Berlin had been mentioned. The President
answered no.
Senator Humphrey commented further that the Soviet position seemed identical
with what Khrushchev stated before, and the President commented that the
only new point was the time limit. Senator Humphrey rejoined that even the
time limit was not new, in the sense that there had been time limits before.
The President stated that in his judgment Khrushchev was talking in cold terms
of a genuinely vital present interest.
Senator Saltonstall asked whether Khrushchev seemed moved by fear of West
Germany. The President answered that this was what Khrushchev said, but really
he was interested in the build-up of East Germany.
In response to a question, the President said that Khrushchev claimed his
relations with China were very good.
Senator Dirksen found four propositions in this report: (1) two Germanys,
(2) Berlin in the middle of one of them, (3) concessions on troops and access,
(4) in the future, when the sovereign power says that you have to take your
troops home, you are sunk.
The President said that in his own speech that evening/7/ he would say the situation was serious, but not press it home too sharply. We shall soon send back an aide-memoire on our own rights,/8/ and we must consider what else we can do.
/7/For text of the President's radio and television report to the American
people on his trip to Europe, see Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 441-446.
/8/For text of the U.S. reply, July 17, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 753-760.
Senator Russell said that at present he would be against an airlift. The
President replied that we can decide when the time comes. The President further
reported that after lunch on Sunday, he had come back to speak to Khrushchev
again because he thought he ought to know that this matter of rights of access
was a most vital matter to the U.S. The President said that he thought
Khrushchev would indeed probably sign a Peace Treaty, and we would then
say simply we do not accept it.
Senator Saltonstall asked whether Macmillan and the British were as strong
as de Gaulle on this question. The President answered that the British were
not as precise. Macmillan was ready to meet his commitments, but de Gaulle
seemed harder--ready for war if necessary.
Senator Russell asked how long we have to decide. The President said we would answer the aide-memoire which had much superficial attractiveness. We must get our own position clear on the rights of the people of West Berlin to be free. Then he thought the matter would go along until after the German elections.
Senator Saltonstall asked if Khrushchev seemed confident. The President
answered that he thought Khrushchev probably had a knife in himself a little
on this one. Not all the advantages are on his side. He will have to initiate
the blockade, and it will not be easy for him to give the appearance of
right on his side.
Senator Dirksen asked if the Germans were all out of Austria now. The
President said yes.
Senator Humphrey said that the danger in a peace treaty is that Khrushchev can disclaim responsibility so that in the event of an incident--if, for example, we should have to shoot down Germans--he would be peacefully out of it, and we would be appearing to start warlike action.
The President said we should continue to hold the Russians responsible.
We have to show them that there is a very serious chance that this could lead
to war.
Senator Dirksen said that this was the one place where Lucius Clay/9/ fumbled--we had no easement--we had to go to an airlift. There followed some discussion of how a country lawyer would handle the matter.
/9/General Lucius D. Clay, U.S. Military Governor for Germany during the Berlin blockade, 1948-1949.
The President asked Senator Russell what the U.S. should do if after
a peace treaty the East Germans should deny access. Senator Russell said
this was a big decision. He believed that if we are firm, it would not come
to that point. He asked whether a Free City could be absolutely free and
independent of the GDR.
Senator Dirksen asked what the timetable was. The President said we ought not to indicate. Senator Dirksen said the leadership ought to have time to puzzle over it a couple of weeks and then give its views to the President. The President said this was all right, since all we needed now was to send back an aide-memoire stating our own position.
The Vice President asked if it was not fair to state that Khrushchev's
position as stated to the President was as it has always been, while the President
in turn had restated our position.
Congressman McCormack asked for the President's basic impression of the man
Khrushchev. The President replied that he was very tough. The President had
read all of his conversations with President Eisenhower and felt that Khrushchev
then, and now, was a persistent counter-puncher. He had not been disagreeable.
He came to talk on Germany. He wanted "to know whether we would fight" and
that was why the President went back after lunch to make our position very
plain. Then Khrushchev had said that if there was to be war, then let it
come now, and the President "gave him a box of Sandwich glass and left." The
President felt it was going to be very close, and awfully tough. The Soviets
feel that our edge is gone on the nuclear side.
On Laos, the President had asked Khrushchev how we could talk on any matter
if we could not agree on Laos.
The President said that in his speech he would give no sense of a time limit,
that what he would try to communicate was how the Soviets were planning
to operate with patience from their inside lines, hoping to pick up countries
which would tumble from interior weakness. In this situation, SEATO and
CENTO were not worth a damn, and we must face a different problem.
The President discussed privately with Senator Fulbright a call to the UAR Ambassador.
Senator Dirksen asked about public comment. After some discussion, there
seemed to be agreement with the Speaker's view that all concerned would simply
say that the President had given a preview of what he was going to say that
evening. The Vice President summarized his sense of the Vienna meeting by
saying that "he expressed his view and we re-expressed ours." The President
agreed, and there was further agreement that we should say nothing that would
seem to put Khrushchev in a corner where he must fight back.
Senator Humphrey suggested that the President might presently stress the
notion of reunification of Germany--our strong point in the argument.
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